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BLD-256        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-2535 
 ___________ 
 
 AARON PAUL LLOYD, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
JAWAD A. SALAMEH, Medical Doctor at SCI Laurel Highlands;  
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;  
JEFFREY A. BEARD; ANNETTE KOWALEWSKI 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 3-11-cv-00079) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 4, 2011 
 
 Before:  SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: August 23, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Aaron Lloyd appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his 
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complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
and exercise plenary review over the District Court’s order.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  For the reasons discussed below, we will summarily affirm 
the District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
Lloyd, who is incarcerated at SCI Laurel Highlands, filed a complaint in the 
District Court alleging that the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by 
providing him inadequate medical care.  More specifically, he complained that Dr. 
Salameh prescribed him Ditropan despite the fact that he was already taking Depakote 
and Remeron, and that these medications reacted adversely, causing him to become 
disoriented and confused.   
A magistrate judge recommended that the complaint be dismissed under § 1915.  
As the magistrate judge explained, 
“a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for 
denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official 
knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the 
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be 
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw 
the inference.” 
 
R&R at 2 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).  Here, the magistrate 
judge concluded, Lloyd had alleged only that the defendants “showed medical 
malpractice and negligence,” which was not sufficient to state a claim under the Eighth 
Amendment.  Nevertheless, the magistrate judge invited Lloyd to amend his complaint.  
Lloyd then filed a document that he intended to serve both as objections to the 
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report and recommendation and an amendment to his complaint.  In this document, Lloyd 
reiterated the allegations from his complaint, but also included the deliberate-indifference 
elements as set forth in the report and recommendation.  The District Court concluded 
that the new allegations did not cure the complaint’s deficiencies, and dismissed it 
because it “allege[d] negligence . . . and not deliberate indifference.”  Lloyd then filed a 
timely notice of appeal. 
We agree with the District Court that Lloyd’s allegations do not suffice to show 
deliberate indifference with respect to the care he received.  See, e.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 
836.  “To act with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is to recklessly 
disregard a substantial risk of serious harm.”  Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  For instance, a plaintiff may make this showing by establishing that the 
defendants “intentionally den[ied] or delay[ed] medical care.”  Id. (quotation marks 
omitted).  However, “[w]here a prisoner has received some medical attention and the 
dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to 
second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort 
law.”  United States ex rel. Walker v. Fayette Cnty., 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
Here, Lloyd has claimed that in an effort to treat his bladder condition, Dr. 
Salameh prescribed Ditropan, which had an “idiosyncratic reaction” with medication that 
he was already taking.  While Lloyd contends that Dr. Salameh should not have 
prescribed Ditropan, we have recognized that courts will “disavow any attempt to 
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second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of treatment[,] which 
remains a question of sound professional judgment.”  Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. 
Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) (internal alterations, quotation marks omitted)).  
Lloyd does not suggest that the decision to provide him with Ditropan was based on an 
ulterior motive beyond routine patient care, and he acknowledges that he received prompt 
and extensive treatment following his reaction.  Cf. White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 
109 (3d Cir. 1990).  While Lloyd included in his amended complaint certain legal 
conclusions in support of his claim, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the 
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”  Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).    
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order dismissing the 
case.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  We also deny Lloyd’s request for the 
appointment of counsel.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1993). 
